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Incentives and reflective equilibrium in
distributive justice debates
Julian Lamont
Abstract: For the last thirty years one of the dominant economic policies has
been the cutting of the top marginal tax rates. While this policy has been
partly motivated by the self-interest of high income earners, it also has had
considerable theoretical support from a wide range of distributive justice
theorists starting with John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971. Rawls argued
that if the incentives created by inequality maximized the position of the least
advantaged then they were morally justified. There have been many variants
of this position since. The most common theme of them is that incentives to
work harder and innovate, although creating inequality, are morally justified
because of the greater good generated by the resultant increase in GDP. The
main policy instrument available to governments to create such incentive has
been the cutting of the top marginal income rates and this has been done
systematically across all industrialized nations.
The method of wide reflective equilibrium requires us to use the best consensus
from economics in our reasoning about distributive justice. The systematic
cutting of tax rates over thirty years has provided a reasonable experiment on
the thesis that such cutting provides an overall increased labor supply and
resultant increase in GDP. The suggestion of this paper is that a reasonable
consensus can now be reached that, over the ranges of inequality and GDP
that we have had over the last 50 years and are likely to have over the next 50
years, such incentives do not provide the claimed benefits. Hence, we are getting
increased inequality for no compensating benefit.
Keywords: distributive justice, incentives, inequality, income, tax, reflective
equilibrium
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Introduction
There is much to be gained from having more interaction between economists,
philosophers, political scientists and policy-makers on the topic of distributive
justice and, ultimately, on economic policy. But given the innumerable
overlapping interests, the question arises as to where best to focus the attention for
the interaction. The suggestion pursued here is that settling a couple of
fundamental issues on incentives is likely to be the most productive area given
both the current state of distributive justice debates and the recent economic
history of the industrialized world. With this in mind, the plan here is to try to
harvest and present, two sets of findings which, if accepted, should be very helpful
for better understanding the proper role of incentives in the context of distributive
justice and economic policy. The advantage of doing this in an interdisciplinary
journal is that theorists from different disciplines can cast different critical eyes
over the material. Some economists will be best placed to determine whether the
summaries of economic findings are in fact accurate and reliable for the purpose
to which they are put. Philosophers and political scientists will be able to cast a
philosophically critical eye over the claims to ascertain their plausibility and
applicability to their own distributive justice views. Methodologists from all fields
will be interested in the underlying discussion of reflective equilibrium and its
application in this particular context. In this way we can start to establish a
central set of relevant views to help focus the interdisciplinary dialogue on this
important topic of distributive justice.
Incentives and GDP 1
Unfortunately, there is no single dominant characterization of “incentives”. In the
political context, the term “incentives” is used most commonly when talking about
tax cuts. So, in the case of labor incentives, which are the main focus of this
paper, the extra after-tax earnings that would occur as a result of cuts in marginal
income tax rates are normally the incentives of interest. What most theorists have
in mind, when talking about incentives, is a system of differential earnings. The
idea is that the prospect of having differentially higher earnings gives people the
incentive to work harder and/or more innovatively. Of course, these two usages are
simply related – cutting marginal tax rates is one way to increase the differentials.
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Over the last four decades there has been a dramatic reduction in the top marginal
income tax rates across the industrialized world. A full specification of what has
caused these cuts is outside the scope of this paper. Two obvious candidates are that
such cuts have been politically advantageous to politicians; and the “conspiracy” view
that various groupings of rich individuals who directly benefit from such reductions
have used their political power to bring about the reductions. No doubt both of these
causes are present to some degree. The third cause is the one of interest here because
it is the one most amenable to rational argument.[1] Politicians and their advisers
do not give as their reason for cutting the top marginal rates, “We’re doing this
because we think it is going to get us reelected” or “We’re doing this because our
political donors/cronies/supporters will be richer as a result.” Instead, they give a
reason, fairly consistent across all the industrialized economies, which is not so
directly self-interested: that decreasing the top marginal tax rates will give people
the incentive to work harder and/or more innovatively and thereby grow GDP. The
variation in the reason usually occurs at this point in terms of the explanation for
why growing GDP is good – more utility; more money for education/health care or
other social services; more money to help the poor, and so on – the variations,
though important, need not concern us here.
So the first empirical claim, of interest, is that having a system of differential
earnings results in greater GDP than having a system of strict equality of
earnings. The claim is clearly true, [2] so disputing it at this level of generality
will not advance debates about distributive justice. The empirical issue of interest
is what effect differential earnings, of the size that industrialized democracies
have had over the last half century (and are likely to have over the next
generation [3]), have on GDP.
An initial way of approaching this issue is to look at the literature examining the
correlations between growth in GDP and the size of the earnings differentials.
The available literature unfortunately mainly uses income differentials so it
should be seen more as useful for shedding light on packages of incentives to
work, invest and save, rather than just incentives to work. The predominant
finding is that a negative correlation exists between income inequality and GDP.
For instance, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994), show
that greater income inequality lowers subsequent growth after controlling for
initial GDP per head and initial human capital (Pak). Moreover, it has been
shown that this finding is robust under many different model specifications and to
changes in the measure of income inequality (Clarke).
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How useful are these findings for those concerned about distributive justice? Well,
it suggests we should be wary of people/countries advocating/pursuing policies
likely to increase inequality. Such people typically support their policies by
claiming that increasing “incentives” will increase the economic pie and that
squashing down the differentials dampens the incentives to work hard/innovate/
save/invest etc. If this is correct, then we should expect those countries with higher
income inequalities to have faster economic growth. However, the evidence
suggests the opposite – slower economic growth. At best, the evidence suggests no
relation at the relevant levels – increased inequality with no compensating
increase in economic growth.
Reflective equilibrium and empirical data
To many economists it is immediately obvious that it is important to incorporate
such economic findings into one’s policy prescriptions. They are likely to disagree,
though, about whether the findings above are accurate, i.e. whether the above is
the right economic conclusion to draw from the literature and, hence, to use to
shape policy. However, many philosophers and political theorists/scientists seem to
have been much less convinced of the importance of economic findings to their
deliberations about distributive justice (to the extent, in fact, that many are
completely uninformed of the above findings and related ones). So it is worth
defending, in some detail, the relevance of these findings to discussions about
distributive justice and economic policy.
Consider, as an example, a normative theory having as one of its central claims
that inequalities which increase the average income are morally justified. Neither
political theorists nor the broader educated community evaluate this claim in an
empirical vacuum. They evaluate such a claim within the context of their own
perceptions of what their societies are currently like, have recently been like, and/
or could possibly evolve into within their lifetimes. Now a philosopher arguing for
such a moral claim is likely to have the empirical belief, shared by most
economists around the world, that systems allowing some income inequality are
likely to result in higher average income than systems that do not. The issue then
becomes what concrete normative claims does this abstract moral claim yield for
our current society? It is important to remind ourselves that we can only arrive at
a claim about what should be done in the world by adding some empirical claims
to the abstract normative claim. Although this is a simple philosophical point it is
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one too often ignored in discussions about distributive justice. Moreover, for those
many people who believe in the methodology of reflective equilibrium (Daniels),
the conjoining of these empirical claims is essential for the assessment of the
plausibility of their moral claims.
Suppose, for example, Betty considers a moral argument (along an analogous line,
perhaps, as John Rawls’ argument for his difference principle (Rawls)) and
becomes convinced that inequalities are morally justified because they increase
average income. Having developed this view, she may become engaged in intense
debate with others, without ever surveying the economic literature to determine
whether the empirical claim is correct – whether inequalities actually increase
average income. Parties to this debate will all have their own beliefs, commonly
not fully articulated, about what the relevant empirical facts are. Further, rather
than just one relevant empirical fact, “inequalities do or do not increase average
income,” the empirical evidence may generate a range of facts with differing
normative importance. It may be that inequalities far smaller than those currently
existing have very significant positive effects on average income. It may be that
small inequalities do not have significant positive effects on average income, but
that the larger, currently existing inequalities do. It may be that only much larger
inequalities will have significant positive effects on average income – and a range
of positions in-between. People cannot rationally employ a method of reflective
equilibrium without knowing the empirical literature, but most of the
philosophical debates are not so empirically informed.
Evaluation of the claim that inequalities which increase average income are
morally justified should require an examination of the current findings on the
relationship between the various levels of inequality and average incomes. The
original moral claim needs to be decomposed into a series of concrete moral claims
about each combination of a level of inequality and the resulting average income.
These concrete moral claims can then be tested against our considered moral
judgments. Without doing this we cannot properly evaluate the original moral
claim and assert we are committed to it. When doing this testing it is plausible to
think that people will often come to have conflicts between their original abstract
moral claim and their considered moral judgments about the world.
To take an extreme case, suppose Betty finds that the most plausible economic
findings suggest that a relatively small increase in inequality away from perfect
equality results in a very rapid rise in average income but that, after this rapid
rise, only very small increases in average income result from much larger
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increases in inequality. Then Betty may come to have less confidence in her
original moral theory. For instance, she may think it omits consideration of
another important value, say equality, which will sometimes conflict with the
value of raising the average standard of living – this omission is, in a sense,
revealed to her through her considered moral judgments about the concrete
situations, even though she was not aware of it when constructing the original
argument.[4] As is always the case with reflective equilibrium, she will have to
choose between modifying her moral theory or her considered moral judgments or
both. But even if she sticks to the original moral theory, without considering the
empirical facts she should not be strongly committed to it because she has not
properly tested it.
More generally, people should not be strongly committed to concrete normative
claims which they think flow from their normative arguments without exploring
the implementation of those in full cognizance of the relevant empirical facts. So,
for instance, Betty should not be supportive of actual inequalities in her society
unless she has investigated whether a lower level of inequality will increase the
average income more.
In addition to this more formal point about rationality and reflective equilibrium,
a point about rationally using one’s intellectual energies should also be made.
Suppose, for instance, it turns out that the economic evidence suggests that for the
probable ranges of inequality politically feasible for our society over the next
generation, the effects on average income are negligible. Then there is little point
in having an impassioned debate about, or trying to further develop and refine
moral arguments for, the abstract moral claim that inequalities which increase
average income are morally justified – it will make no practical difference who is
right.
Incentives and GDP 2
Having criticized the form of a group of philosophical debates about distributive
justice and having emphasized the importance of the relevant empirical findings
to those debates, it is important also to acknowledge how the empirical findings
are often not conclusive or comprehensive enough to function in the way we would
hope if we were rationally employing the methodology of reflective equilibrium.
This is probably true of the findings relied on earlier – those concerned with
distributive justice cannot get as much positive use from the current literature on
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the relation between income inequality and GDP growth as they may hope. The
main reason is that mechanisms by which income inequality and GDP growth are
related are poorly understood.[5] So, for instance, we cannot assert that pursuing
policies to reduce income inequality will increase GDP.
The empirical findings though are useful enough to justifiably make one very
skeptical of anyone advocating policies which will increase inequality and
justifying them on the grounds that the resulting incentive structure will increase
GDP. That is a significant empirical point to add to the distributive justice
literature. We may also be able to squeeze a little bit more out of the findings. The
literature suggests that of the range of economies we have had over the last 50
years, the more egalitarian ones have a higher or equal rate of GDP growth
compared to the more inegalitarian ones. If one believes that there are strong
moral reasons for having a more egalitarian economy, and that inequality appears,
at worse, not correlated with GDP growth over the range we are talking about,
then one has reasons to start pursuing policies to increase equality and see where
that leads. One of the most commonly cited impediments to pursue such equality –
loss of GDP – does not seem significant, at least across the range of industrialized
economies we have witnessed over the last 50 years. Indeed, you would continue to
have such strong reasons to try out such policies, even if the dissident view, that
the relationship is a weakly positive one, turns out to be correct. That seems very
significant, but perhaps is mildly overstated given the nature of the economic
literature on this topic. Time to start digging a little deeper into some related
literature.
Income tax progressivity and labor supply
Before discussing tax/transfer systems in detail it is worthwhile making a quick
relevant empirical observation/terminological stipulation about these systems.
Most tax/transfer systems in existence could be replaced by equivalent tax systems
and so it is simpler to just focus on the progressivity of the tax system. The fact
that this replacement can be done is not without significance. The majority of
countries provide little or no net transfers to the poor that could not replaced by
lowering and averaging over time, the tax rate on the poor.[6] I think the majority
of industrialized populations think that what is going on in their societies is that
richer people are being taxed and the money is being transferred to the poor.
However, what is not realized is that the transfers are not so large that an
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equivalent distribution could not be achieved by instead reducing taxation of the
poor. My guess is that there is more political support for reducing taxes on the
poor than there is for transfers to them. If this is true, it provides a good reason
for converting all current tax/transfer systems to tax only systems – but that is a
topic for another time.
The discussion here will be confined to incentives to work because they have been
the most commonly discussed incentives in distributive justice debates. Claims
about incentives to invest and save are also important and some of the analysis
given here can be extended to these but the extra complications they introduce
would take us too far afield. To focus even more tightly, the rest of the paper will
be focused on the issue of cutting marginal income tax rates.
One often hears references to efficiency-equity trade-offs as though these are a
fixed feature of all economic policy decisions that take into account distributive
justice considerations. Probably the most common of these supposed trade-offs is
the one that is supposed to exist between tax progressivity and labor supply. The
economic literature on this has been quite extensive – it has been responsive to the
political interest in the issue. All the industrialized countries over the last 30
years have had a predominance of business leaders and politicians asserting that
high marginal tax rates are a disincentive to work and that they should be cut.
And indeed they have been cut, often dramatically. The important empirical
question is what has been the effects of these tax cuts.
The most certain effect of the cuts is the significant role they have had in
contributing to the increase in inequality in industrialized nations. For instance,
for the UK, which has had one of the most dramatic rises in income inequality
over the last twenty years (Gottschalk), Clark and Leicester find that the “tax and
benefit reforms since 1979 look very regressive”[7] and that their results suggest
that such “reforms” “may have contributed more than 40 per cent of the overall
rise in income inequality” (156). Although there has been this significant rise in
income inequality, the (usually implicit) claim has been that this is worth it
because of the gains that come from the increased incentive to work. So we have
two empirical issues of interest here:
(1) Progressive tax rates appear to be one of the main effective policy tools for
dealing with inequality
(2) It is claimed that making income tax rates less progressive has a significant
positive effect on the incentive to work.
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The first claim seems settled. What about the second claim?
The first thing to note about the second claim is that there are heated ongoing
disputes between economists about whether lowering top marginal tax rates
increases labor supply (is positive) or decreases it (is negative). To an outsider it
seems that people’s research findings on this, not uncommonly, seem to follow
their politics. This makes it difficult for anyone to work out what is the best
consensus – what claims are outliers. Even given this difficulty it seems clear that
whatever the truth is about whether the net effect is positive, negative or neutral,
the size of the effect is not dramatic one way or the other. I think the following
gives a reasonable summary of the state of play in the literature:
An extensive literature in labor economics has shown that there is very little impact
of changes in tax rates on labor supply for most people, particularly for prime-age
working men (Pencavel; MaCurdy; Heckman; Moffitt).[8] This would seem to
indicate that the central tenet of the Laffer curve is demonstrably false – marginal
rates seem to have little impact on the amount that people work (Goolsbee 2).
Sometimes people, who are not familiar with the literature, disbelieve this
finding. They think that it is obviously true that if people are able to earn more
on their marginal income then they will work more. It is difficult to identify the
source of this disbelief, whether it is because people have become convinced by
constantly listening to public figures asserting the claim over the last 30 years. Or
perhaps it is because they have in their minds a sketch of an economic model of
human behavior which gives them confidence in their conclusion. This second
source suggests it is worthwhile looking at the relevant economic model.
The model of what are the income and substitution effects of tax cuts on labor
supply is a common one, readily found in most undergraduate labor economics text
books. Despite this, it is worthwhile discussing it here because understanding it is
likely to give people more confidence in the empirical results – they will have a
plausible model of human behavior to explain the empirical results.
For those who want an intuitive explanation rather than the formal model of the
textbooks, it can be understood along the following lines. Cutting the marginal
rate of income tax effectively raises the after-tax wage rate for an individual. The
overall effect this has on the individual’s choice of how many hours to work can
be thought of as being made up of two separate effects which work in opposite
directions. The first effect, the substitution effect, is the one that obviously most
people conjure to mind. The increase in the wage rate effectively makes leisure
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relatively more expensive than it was before the increase in wage rate. An hour of
work foregone now involves a greater loss than it did before. This motivates people
to work longer – the payoff is now greater for the extra work.
The income effect works in the opposite direction. Cutting the tax rates effectively
makes people wealthier than they were before – for the same amount of work they
receive a higher, after-tax income. If people think of leisure as a normal good,
which they do, then when they receive higher incomes they will “purchase” more
of this good. They will buy more leisure and hence work less. This is a
phenomenon with which we are all familiar. It manifests itself in innumerable
ways. From the doctor who decides to play golf every Wednesday afternoon; to the
parent who decides to work less hours and spend more time with the kids because
they have enough to cover the mortgage and what they consider are the necessities
of life; to the “seachange” or “downsize” phenomena; through to the innumerable
people who retire early and hence “purchase” a lot more lifetime leisure.
The total change in hours worked then is the sum of these two effects. Cutting
marginal tax rates gives people the incentive to work more because they can earn
more per hour from working than they did before (the substitution effect). At the
same time it gives them an incentive to work less because they are wealthier as a
result of the tax cuts and so can afford to take more leisure time and still satisfy
their same consumptive desires (the income effect). The theory does not postulate
any necessary relationship between the sizes of these two effects. They work in
opposite directions and you need to go look at the world to see the relative size of
these effects. They will be different for different people. If, over the whole economy
the substitution effect is smaller than the income effect, then the overall effect of an
after-tax wage rise is a net reduction in hours worked. If the substitution effect is
larger than the income effect, then there will be a net increase in hours worked. The
central empirical finding, crucial for all debates about distributive justice and
economic policy, is that the effects are similar in size.
The earlier retirement phenomenon is worth commenting further on in relation to
the empirical findings. There are two main mechanisms by which the income
effect can operate. The first is by people reducing their hours of work. The second
is by people not reducing their hours of work but continuing to work the same and
then retiring earlier (the leisure is “bought” in a lump sum at the end). The
existence of these two mechanisms introduces considerable difficulty into getting
reliable data except over very substantial periods of time. It is further complicated
by whether people think the tax cuts are permanent or temporary.
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In the 1980s there were very substantial cuts in marginal income tax rates in most
industrialized countries. This would have provided a very good experiment for testing
the size of the income and substitution effects. From that point on we could observe
people’s behavioral response in terms of total lifetime hours worked. Note that it is
total lifetime hours worked that is important. So, for instance, it would be compatible
with the income effect being larger than the substitution effect that people during the
1980s and 1990s substantially increased their working hours over what they were
working in the 1970s and then retired or intend to retire earlier than they would have
in the 2000s and 2010s – as long as the increase in hours worked was more than offset
by the hours lost by early retirement. In a sense then the experiment of any of these
tax changes is not over until the people who experienced them have retired. A further
complication comes about if people do not think the tax reductions are permanent. The
large tax cuts of the 1980s were indeed not permanent particularly in the US. Many
countries wound back the large cuts back during the 1990s, though not fully.[9] For all
those people who suspected the supply-side economic theory was wrong, and that would
have included a lot of people who knew nothing about economics but pretty quickly
observed spiraling deficits, it would have been rational to considerably up their work
efforts while the taxes stayed low – the old “make hay while the sun shines”
phenomenon. If this was the case, then we might expect an even greater increase in
working hours to be observed during the 1980s and this would still be compatible with
the income effects being greater than the substitution effects – it all depends on how
the retirement patterns play out. Unfortunately (only from the epistemological point of
view), the experiment was changed in the 1990s with the winding back of some of the
cuts, so we do not have the nice data that we could have had. Still, the data we do have
so far suggests the effects are of a similar size. But, as noted, the experiment is still
ongoing. If the baby-boomers retire earlier than they would have, that will further
push the results towards marginal income tax cuts having no or negative effects on
labor supply.
Conclusion
The central claims here are as follows:
1. The large cuts in marginal income tax rates occurring over the last 30 years
have not provided the extra incentive to work. The tax cuts did not cause a
significant net increase in labor supply and hence did not cause an increase in
GDP. Hence, there was no resultant good that resulted from the cuts in marginal
income tax rates.
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2. The cuts in the marginal income tax rates did significantly contribute to an
increase in income inequality over the last 30 years.
3. Hence, one of the most significant economic policies of the last 30 years is a
failure.
If this is right then it should now play a central role in discussions of distributive
justice and economic policy over the next generation. The belief that there was a
need for labor incentives, in terms of greater post-tax income differentials and lower
marginal tax rates than existed in the 1960-1970s, in order for economic growth to
occur, was a false one. This is a crucial result for those distributive justice theorists
and others who believed that incentives provided by larger income differentials (and
brought about by the main mechanism available to governments to achieve this –
reduction in top marginal tax rates) are morally justified by the resultant growth in
GDP (and whatever good they believed was associated with this). Indeed it is a
crucial result for all those agonizing over the supposed equity-efficiency trade-off in
this area. The result is that for the range of differentials we have had in the last 60
years and are likely to be able to achieve in the next 50 years, there is no noticeable
trade-off. If equality is a good then, we have no reason not to pursue considerably
more of it than we currently have in 2008.
John Rawls said, when discussing the wide reflective equilibrium required for
distributive justice belief formation, that we need to take the best consensus from
the social sciences on their particular epistemological domains in reasoning about
distributive justice and hence economic policy. The question at this point is
whether there is such a consensus on the three points above?
Endnotes
[1] It also feeds into the first cause. Presumably cutting top marginal tax rates has
been politically popular because significant numbers of people have some
combination of empirical and normative beliefs which make them believe such
cutting is good.
[2] In saying it is clearly true does not commit one to any sweeping claim that
humans are only motivated by money – clearly, an empirically false claim. All it
commits one to is that the prospect of earning more income is one, among many, of
the motivating factors for people.
The Journal of Philosophical Economics II:1 (2008) 17
Lamont, Julian (2008) ‘Incentives and reflective equilibrium in distributive
justice debates’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, II:1 , 5-19
[3] The qualification “over the next generation” is inserted at various places
because it is a worthwhile discipline on the discussions which is too often ignored,
particularly by philosophers. It seems rational, in the area of distributive justice,
to use one’s intellectual resources to focus on time frames for which you have at
least reasonable information. A time frame of a generation is not overly
conservative while at the same time takes account of the practical/epistemological
constraints that face us.
[4] The earlier claim that it is irrational to omit the discovery of relevant
empirical data is perhaps too strong. One could achieve a similar result by
conjoining each possible empirical result and testing one’s judgment against the
outcome. Of course, theoretically there are an infinite number of possible
empirical results, but even if we reduced them down to series of sets it is still
horribly inefficient to proceed this way rather than looking at the real empirical
results for the same purpose.
[5] For an examination of one of the possible mechanisms, along with references
to papers exploring other mechanisms, and to papers which find no or a positive
relationship between income inequality and GDP growth, and to some criticisms
of these papers, see Sylwester.
[6] The scope of this claim is widened and strengthened if unemployment benefits
are considered, not as transfers to the poor, but as social insurance payments to the
unemployed. To put it another way, what some consider as transfers to the poor
because they are poor are more properly considered as social insurance benefits
paid to the unemployed and justified by reference to their involuntary
unemployment with the insurance premiums paid by them while they are
working. The claim is also strengthened if we consider transfers over lifetimes
rather than over some lesser period such as a year (Harding).
[7] While Clark and Leicester’s “results seem robust to the chosen year of data on
which reforms are imposed and also to the choice of inequality measure. We have
estimated confidence intervals which are narrow, suggesting that our results are
unlikely to reflect sampling error” (Clarke 156), their results are very sensitive to
the choice of counterfactual world used for comparison.
[8] The statement is less true for women deciding whether to enter the labor force
(Eissa) and possibly for certain groups of workers such as doctors (Showalter) or
entrepreneurs (Carroll) (Goolsbee).
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[9] Of course, this was partly due to the spectacular failure of the supply-side
economic theory (sometimes called Reagonomics) – the idea that the tax cuts
would induce such an increase in the incentive to work and innovate that overall
tax revenues would not be affected by the tax cuts. Once, the deficits started
climbing dramatically it became pretty clear to everyone that the theory was
wrong.
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